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This paper investigates the inter-relation between the central government and the 
municipalities in Costa Rica. It examines episodes in which the central 
government has bailed out the local governments from their obligations. We 
employ empirical and descriptive methods to show how discretionary grants relate 
to the degree of fiscal discipline of the municipality to produce hidden bailouts. 
Political, demographic, and economic variables explain  the allocation of these 
discretionary transfers. 
 
We illustrate the effects of the high concentration of decision-making of 
the central government on the fiscal performance of the municipalities. The 
municipalities play a limited role and its functioning largely depends upon the 
central government.  We argue that the national administration would face a high 
political cost if it did not bail out the local government in several of the episodes 
studied.  Using panel data from 1982-1997 on 81 cantones, we find that the fiscal 
effort of the local government is reduced by the presence of discretionary grants.  
The local governments finance local expenses with these discretionary transfers 
according to our empirical results.  As expected from the centralization issue, 
political variables such as the affiliation of the local administration have 
significant effects on the resources received by the municipalities. 
 
 
                                                 
1 This paper benefited from the comments of Ernesto Stein and participants in the Seminars on Fiscal Discipline in 
Local Governments held in Buenos Aires and Mexico. We thank the IFAM, General Auditing office, Executive Unit 
of the Landfill, AyA, especially José R. Madrigal and Ricardo Murillo and the assistance of Mitzi Hall, Róger 
Madrigal and Susan Rodríguez.  Javier Cascante was originally a member of the team and helped in the initial stages 
of the project.  Alexandra Mora, the Chief of the Specific Allocation Department of the Treasury Ministry, made 
available the reports of each specific allocation since 1983.  Unfortunately, we cannot be thankful to the secretary of 
the executive board of IFAM, Gastón Iglesias Montealegre who prevented us from reviewing the correspondence of 
the executive board. This is a public matter, but his de facto control made it impossible for us to study the existence 
of bailouts in the full set of loans. Errors and omissions are the exclusive responsibility of the authors. Comments 
may be sent to Dr. Hall at ljh223@nyu.edu   5  6
1.  Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the most important episodes of bailouts in Costa Rica, showing how the 
central government bailed out some municipalities from their obligations and discussing the 
determinants of these episodes.  Two types of bailouts are identified.  The first type consists of 
bailouts that are relatively small in dollar terms. T hese episodes are nonetheless worth 
mentioning because they demonstrate the institutional framework that characterizes inter-
governmental relations. The high degree of centralization largely explains how and why the 
national government has repeatedly rescued local governments in these cases.   
On the other hand, extensive discretionary transfers from the central government to the 
local government explain a second group of bailouts.  This paper postulates and shows a 
relationship between these discretionary  grants and the fiscal discipline (or lack thereof) of 
several municipalities as measured by their financial surplus.  These episodes of hidden bailouts 
derive their character from the implicit connection between the fiscal indiscipline of the local 
government and the transfer of grants from the central government.  The high degree of 
centralization of the government explains why these bailouts exist.   
Panel data was constructed on the country’s 81  cantones,  traditional econometric 
methods were applied to identify the interrelation between the fiscal surplus of the municipalities 
and the transfers received from the central government.  Political, demographic, and economic 
variables explain the transfers of the central government to the municipalities.  The different 
parts of the analysis suggest that the lack of effective delegation is primarily responsible for the 
occurrence of bailouts. There is a clear feedback loop among this lack of delegation, the 
influence of national political parties in the local election process and the poor performance of 
local governments in Costa Rica. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section examines political 
organization, the role assigned to municipal councils, and the role of the central government as a 
source of funds. The section discusses the organization of the central government and describes 
how recent changes have attempted to revert the high degree of centralization, although the 
impact of these changes is still unknown.  The financing of the local government’s duties is 
explained in detail, and the section closes with a brief description of municipal borrowing that 
reflects the entire subordination of the local government to the central government by means of 
special laws.   7
The third section closely examines the small-value episodes of municipal bailouts by the 
central government. These episodes involve the Executor Unit of the Rio Azul Landfill, the 
National System of Aqueducts and Sewage Institute (AyA) and the Municipal Development and 
Advisory Institute (IFAM). As looking at these cases clarifies the effective role played by local 
governments in Costa Rica, the section describes the episodes and investigates the determinants 
of these events. The inability of local governments to face economic c rises due to budget 
rigidities and the implicit involvement of the central government are the two main factors 
explaining these bailouts. In case of financial hardship, the central government would face high 
political costs should it decide not to bail out municipalities; the involvement of the central 
government, however, goes well beyond the implicit backing of debts. Indeed, a main 
consideration in the election of local representatives is their ability to obtain resources from the 
Congress. 
The fourth and fifth sections examine the political process underlying the allocation of 
discretionary funds from the national budget to the various municipalities. Econometric methods 
are employed to assess the relationship between obtaining these discretionary grants and the 
fiscal effort carried out by the local council.  Additionally assessed are the effects of a variety of 
socioeconomic, demographic, and local and global political variables for the discretionary 
transfers received by the municipalities. A large database is constructed, with panel data from 
1982-1997 on the country’s 81 cantones and a large set of local and national variables. There is 
evidence that the chances of receiving transfers from the central governments have a negative 
impact on the fiscal efforts of the municipalities, as municipalities tend to substitute part of their 
expenses when they plan to receive discretionary grants.  Political variables also have a 
significant effect on the amount of discretionary resources received by the local government. 
 
2.  Municipalities and Intergovernmental Relations 
 
2.1.  Political Organization 
 
Costa Rica is a unitary republic divided into seven provinces.  There are no provincial 
governments, however, and provinces are divided into cantones. Each of the 81 cantones has a 
local government, the municipality, governed by a municipal council whose size is based on the 
cantón’s number of inhabitants. Councils can be of five, seven or nine members, and councils 
elect one of their members as president. Elections for all municipal councils are held nationwide   8
at the same time, and the main national parties have always participated in municipal elections, 
as well as independent and local political parties. 
The small amount of resources directly managed by the municipalities reflects the large 
degree of centralization in the allocation of public resources. This is clearly shown by 
municipalities’ limited responsibilities as well as by the influence of national politics on the 
election of local representatives.  
The influence of national politics on local elections is to some extent built into the 
electoral system. Not only are all local government elections held on the same day every four 
years, but also national-level elections for the executive and legislative branches. These 
synchronized elections also involve a high level of turnover. The President of the Republic 
cannot be re-elected, and the deputies in the Legislative branch can be re-elected only in non-
consecutive terms. 
The country’s two dominant political parties, the  Partido Unidad Social Cristiana 
(PUSC) and the Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN), further contribute to the convergence of 
local and national politics. These two parties have alternated in the control of the Executive and 
the Legislative branches since 1949.
2  These two parties have representations in every cantón of 
the country. Indeed, most of the municipal councils have been controlled by these two parties 
since 1949.
3  While many  cantones are traditionally affiliated with one of these parties (e.g., 
those in the regions of San Jose and Cartago are traditionally biased towards the PLN, while the 
regions of Puntarenas, Limón and Guanacaste are more oriented to the PUSC), it is common for 
control of a cantón to alternate between the parties. 
 
2.2. Legal Reforms 
 
The tradition of centralization in the public sector dates back to the Constitution of 1871. The 
Central Government has circumvented the local governments by creating institutions with 
national scope that are specialized in providing public services (e.g., security, education, health, 
and more recently potable water).
4 
                                                 
2 Currently, for example, members of the Partido Unidad Social Cristiana hold 27 of the 57 seats in the Legislative 
Assembly, and members of the Partido Liberación Nacional hold 23, with the remainder held by members of 
minority parties. 
3 Yet, recently the importance of local political parties has increased. 
4 See the historical account in Albarracin and Pochet (1990).    9
Several reforms increased the independence and scope of the municipalities from the 
1970s to the 1990s. The promulgation of the Municipal Code in 1970 implemented three major 
changes. First, the Municipal Executive could now be elected by the Municipal Council instead 
of being appointed by the President of the Republic. Second, real estate taxes would be 
automatically transferred to the municipalities. Previously, these funds were allocated to 
municipalities from other discretionary grants made by the Central Government. Third, the 
Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal (IFAM) was created in 1972 with the mission of 
improving local government administrations and providing them with low-cost credit. 
More recently, decentralization has been fostered by three major legislative changes, the 
new Municipal Code, the Real Estate law and the Specific Allocations law.
5  The new Municipal 
Code replaces the Municipal Executive with the Alcalde (mayor), and after 2002, the Alcalde 
will be publicly elected and will have the same standing as the Municipal Council. 
Municipalities will have greater autonomy in spending decisions and flexibility in charging for 
some services such as municipal police and maintenance of public parks. Moreover, 
municipalities will be authorized to issue tax-exempt bonds, and they will be able to delegate 
functions by means that include subcontracting some services. 
The Real Estate Law of 1995 transferred the collection of the real estate tax from the 
Treasury Department to the municipalities. It enabled lower governments to exercise closer 
supervision of this revenue, including reassessment of property that was usually undervalued. In 
a subsequent law, the Congress reduced the real estate tax rate from 0.6 percent to 0.025 percent. 
Finally, the recent Law of Specific Allocations replaced legislators’ ability to distribute 
these grants on a discretional basis with an automatic formula that depends on the community’s 
number of inhabitants, size of the territory and degree of poverty. 
The full impact of these reforms has yet to be seen. The reform of real estate taxes has 
clearly increased the revenues of municipalities, and the larger municipalities have expanded the 
services provided (e.g., the municipal police in San Jose).  This municipality has also issued 
debt. 
 
                                                 
5 See the discussion in Aguilar (1996).   10
2.3  Relative Size of Local Government 
 
Despite the decentralization undertaken in recent years, municipalities’ duties largely remain 
limited to very basic services such as garbage collection, public lighting, local roads and, in some 
communities, potable water service.  The 1998 reform authorizes local governments to provide 
municipal police protection, but overall responsibilities for expenditures remain highly 
centralized.   
In fact, local governments account for a very small and even declining share of total 
public expenditure. In 1997 local government expenditures were equivalent to 4.7 percent of 
central government outlays and accounted for less than 1.1 percent of GDP. By comparison, the 
central government’s share of GDP was 26 percent, as shown in Table 1. 
This centralization of expenditures has strengthened over the years as the ratio of local to 
central government expenditure fell from 5.0 percent in 1980 to 4.2 percent in 1997.  During this 
period the central government not only reduced local governments’ duties but also created 
institutions with national scope specialized in the provision of public services that substituted for 
and limited the activities of municipalities. The 1970 municipal code, extended in the 1998 
reform, clearly defined the fiscal discipline policy that applied to local governments.  The 
municipalities must maintain a balanced fiscal budget, and budget deficits cannot be carried over 
from one year to the next.    
 
Table 1.  Relative Size of Local Governments 1980-1997 








1980  5.0%  1.1%  21.7% 
1985  4.9  0.9  18.2 
1990  3.9  0.8  21.1 
1995  3.1  0.7  23.8 
1997  4.2  1.1  26.0 
 
 
2.4 Government Revenues 
 
Local government expenditures are financed by five types of revenues: taxes, service fees, loans, 
grants and transfers from the Central Executive Government and Specific Allocations (Partidas   11
Específicas, hereafter referred to as SAs). Table 2 summarizes the share of these items during 
1998 as well as the average composition of these revenues during the period from 1980 to 1998.  
Specific allocations are public resources from the National Budget of the Republic 
distributed by the deputies in the Legislative Assembly for local or regional needs to local 
governments and local organizations.  Before the 1998 reform, the deputies exclusively allocated 
these transfers.  The 1998 reform introduced specific poverty and human development criteria to 
local governments to obtain these transfers.  Due to their particular form, SAs are not included in 
the fiscal statements of the local governments.  They represented an additional 4.4 percent of 
total municipal revenue in 1997. 
Specific allocations are highly discretionary in comparison to other sources of revenue 
for local governments. In particular, it is important to contrast these funds with transfers and 
grants that represent a mandatory source of revenue for the municipalities, as SAs accounted for 
6.8 percent of municipal revenues in 1998.  The treasury minister as well as several other 
institutions of the government, including other ministries, autonomous institutions and even the 
Ministry of Defense must allocate part of their budget to the municipalities.   
 
Table 2.  Local Government Sources of Revenue 
Item  1998  1980-1988 
    Share  Average  Std Dv. 
Tax    40.6%  40%  4.6% 
Property Tax  13.9%    18  3.0 
Permits  17.9    12  3.8 
Services, Interests, Fines    28.9  22  5.1 
Sale of Services  19.1    16  2.6 
Interest on Transitory 
Investment 
2.9    NA  NA 
Tax and Service Fines  4.6    NA  NA 
Loans    4.0  4.0  1.7 
Total Grants    6.8  13  7.0 
Current Grants      5  2.2 
Capital Grants      9  5.1 
Prior Period Surplus    19.7  18  3.3 
Total Revenue    100%  100%   
 
Table 2 shows in some detail the sources of finance of the municipalities’ expenditure. 
Taxes and service fees are the two most important and stable sources of revenue, accounting for 
approximately 70 percent of total income, while the share of service fees increased in the last 
several years and represented 28.9 percent of total revenue in 1998. Fees for services and goods   12
such as potable water, garbage collection and cleaning public roads represented 19.1 percent of 
total revenue. On the other hand, loans and g rants provide a relatively small share of total 
revenue.  The higher volatility (as measured by the standard deviation), suggests that they 
provide flexible means to obtain resources and probably provide a form of  weak budget 
constraint on the municipalities. 
Most revenue is collected at the local level. When the degree of vertical imbalance is 
defined as the proportion of total revenue not collected at the local level to total income, this 
ratio on average across municipalities was found to be 4.7 percent in 1998.
6  This low degree of 
vertical imbalance reflects the fact that the few activities assigned to local governments are 
mostly charged directly to the end user. In addition to being low, the degree of vertical imbalance 
has steadily decreased since 1980. There is reason to believe that part of this decline is associated 
with reductions in transfers from the Central Government due to an increasing public debt 
burden. The reduction also reflects the reassigning of the property tax to local governments in 
1995 and increases in revenues from permit and service fees. 
The low degree of vertical imbalance contrasts with the low flexibility of revenue.  
Municipalities can alter only 25 percent of their total revenue, including the sale of services and 
goods, and even modifying these items is time-consuming and subject to financial rigidities.  The 
General Auditing Office must approve the modification of these fees, which usually takes from 
six months to one year. 
 
2.5.  Municipal Borrowing 
 
Figure 1 and 2 present local governments’ share of debt with respect to their total revenue and 
the total amount of debt in constant terms since 1979, respectively.  Municipalities financed on 
average 5 percent of their expenditures through debt and, as Figure 1 shows, this source of 
funding has been very volatile, with high and low points of 9 percent and 2 percent, respectively.  
The lowest level of municipal borrowing is observed during the economic crisis of the 1980s and 
the period of the closing of the Municipal Development and Advisory Institute (IFAM). 
                                                 
6 For discussions on the notion of vertical fiscal imbalances, see Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996), von Hagen 
(1991), Stein (1998), and IADB (1998).   13
The experience of borrowing by local governments relates to the creation and developing 
of the (IFAM).  The IFAM was created in 1970
7 with the main objective of promoting and 
developing municipal governments, and the provision of low-cost loans was its main channel for 
reaching this goal.  The government financed the IFAM through the collection and transfer of 
taxes that were initially part of local government revenue.  These low-cost funds enabled the 
IFAM to offer loans at very flexible rates.   
 
Figure 1. 




























An important regulation behind the credit intermediation of the IFAM is the inability of 
the IFAM  to revoke  any loan previously conceded to the municipalities.  Although the 
                                                 
7 The IFAM was technically closed in 1996; however, it is still operating.   

































Contraloría General de la República (CGR) enforced this regulation, the IFAM used several legal 
exclusions to restructure previous debts with municipalities under financial stress.  In particular, 
the CGR paid special attention to the nominal value of the debt, implicitly allowing the IFAM to 
refinance several loans by means of weakening the initial loan conditions.  Several bailout 
episodes discussed in this paper were produced in this form. 
Local governments were also allowed to borrow from domestic capital banks or issue 
bonds.  This source of revenue and the contracting of external loans were severely regulated by 
the central government, and they always required the approval of the Legislative Assembly and 
the CGR.  This regulation, which did not apply to IFAM loans, combined with the low cost of 
the institution’s loans, favored this source of debt in comparison to other sources of borrowing. 
This tight and highly controlled borrowing policy also reflects the high degree of 
government centralization.  According to the municipal code,  local governments were not 
allowed to carry deficits for periods longer than a year.  A local government’s deficit created 
during one fiscal year forces the municipality to provide enough resources during the next fiscal 
year to cover such deficits if their budget is to be approved, and the CGR has the legal right to 
reject a municipality’s budget until those payments are explicitly considered.   
Consequently, debts or other expenses not properly covered during a fiscal year are 
difficult to carry over to other periods.  This restriction, for instance, led to the Rio Azul landfill 
bailout that will be described below.  The CGR will not approve any budget that does not include 
enough resources to cover repayment of debts, and the 1970 law went so far as to stipulate that 
no more than 10 percent of the ordinary revenue could be used to pay debts.   
The 1998 municipal code changed local governments’ access to borrowing, as foreign as 
well as internal borrowing was facilitated by the emission of tax-exempt municipal bonds.  At 
the same time, however, the balanced budget requirement still exists, and the municipalities are 
closely supervised regarding fiscal discipline.  
 
3. Bailout Episodes and their Determinants 
 
This section analyzes episodes in which the Central Government has assumed the obligations of 
local governments. The cases identified in Costa Rica are different in nature and style than those 
in federal countries, and the restrictions on municipal financing described above practically 
eliminate municipalities’ ability to borrow from public sources. Nonetheless, three major   15
municipal bailouts were identified: (i) the aqueduct of Cartago, (ii) the Landfill of Rio Azul and 
(iii) the default on loans from the IFAM. All are associated with the provision of services and 
responded mainly to the high political pressure faced by both Central and local governments.  
Estimated at approximately US$8 million, the bailouts are not large in absolute terms. They are, 
however, significant in relative terms, accounting for  on average 40 percent of the debts 
contracted.  Despite the small amounts involved, these episodes provide useful insights into the 
intergovernmental relations that produce bailouts.  
 
3.1 The Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (AyA) 
 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) financed the construction of the aqueduct system 
of three municipalities in the eastern zone of the Greater Metropolitan Area of Costa Rica: 
Cartago, Paraiso and Oreamuno. Because of  “economic” reasons and the municipalities’ lack of 
technical capacity, the National System of Aqueduct and Sewage Institute (known by its Spanish 
acronym AyA) was responsible for this construction. The municipalities signed agreements with 
the Central government and the AyA in 1987 so that once the works were constructed their value 
would be paid through a program of payments and fixed quotas under the same conditions as the 
credit was granted by the IDB.  
Construction was completed in 1992 (with the exception of the second stage of 
construction in Cartago) and the pending amount of debts at that time is shown in Table 3. 
Nevertheless, the payments of these debts did not begin immediately after the works were 
finished.  Paraiso and Oreamuno began payments in June and January of 1995, respectively, 
while Cartago did not do so until December of 1997. 
 









Cartago     
1
st Stage  1991  3.0 
2
nd Stage  1995  0.8 
Oreamuno  1991  0.8 
Paraiso  1991  1.2 
   16
There are several reasons for the arrears.  First, the municipalities refused to increase 
water rates. The existing rates did not cover the cost of the project, and a 60-percent rate increase 
was recommended for the first year. This was rejected by the municipalities, however, because 
of the anticipated social and political consequences; in addition, the mechanisms of tax and fees 
collection are weak and characterized by high rates of default. The municipalities were thus 
hampered not only by the lack of efficiency in collection have an influence, but also by the high 
cost of legal action. In addition, the suspension of service represented potential externalities in 
public health and sanitation that the municipalities would have found unacceptable.
8    
Second, the municipalities objected to the arrangements made by the AyA. Some argued 
that the AyA did not want to hand the blueprints of the project to the municipalities in order to 
retain control of the aqueduct’s management. As a result, the local governments would not start 
payments until these engineering and administrative issues were cleared up. 
Third, political factors influenced the non-payment of the obligations in those years. The 
Central Fovernment needed the support of Juan Guillermo Brenes Castillo,
9 the well-known 
independent deputy from Cartago, and a compromise between PLN and Brenes Castillo 
eventually eased the conditions for the municipalities involved. The results included agreements 
for SAs of more than a million dollars for the Cartago aqueduct dollars (see La Nación, 1 May 
1995). 
Thus, the disputes lasted approximately five years, during which time the Central 
government made payments to the IADB. Oreamuno and Paraiso began to pay their debts in 
January and June of 1995, respectively, and Cartago in December of 1997. The municipalities of 
Cartago and Paraiso maintained the same financial conditions (amount, term, interest rate) as in 
1991, however, while the remainder of Oreamuno’s debt was reduced by 50 percent.  As of 
March of 1999, the municipalities of Cartago and Oreamuno have not paid their quotas on time; 
Oreamuno has 14 quotas pending to date, that is, Oreamuno has paid only one quota since 1992. 
Table 4 summarizes the financial impact of the bailout. In order to quantify the effects of 
moratoria, arrears and changes in the terms of the contracts, the value of these changes is 
computed in present values. The debts are valued in 1998 dollar terms, and the inter-bank 
                                                 
8 Even in the opinion of some municipal authorities of the locations mentioned, water is considered a merit good and 
late payment should not be a motive for suspension. It is estimated that the political and social costs would be higher 
than the social benefit if the service were canceled punctually. 
9 He is perhaps better-known by his nickname “Cachimbal,” a colloquial term meaning a large amount; this relates 
to his ability to channel Central Government funds and projects to his district.   17
exchange rate of that year was used. An average inflation rate of 15 percent and a market interest 
rate of 20 percent annually have been assumed. (The same methodology is employed to calculate 
all the episodes of bailouts in this paper unless otherwise mentioned.)  Particularly noteworthy is 
that the delay in payments for Cartago meant a 44.8 percent reduction in the value of the loan. 
 
 






Total Debt (%) 
Cartago  2,622,589  44.8 
Oreamuno  259,542  16.5 
Paraiso  249,056  14.3 
Total  $3,131,187   
 
 
3.2 The Rio Azul Landfill  
 
Since 1972, the 12 municipalities that make up the Metropolitan Area have used the Rio Azul 
landfill, which is managed by the municipality of San Jose. During the period between 1972 and 
1993, the Municipality of San Jose accumulated bills reaching US$1.4 million, which were never 
recovered. The General Auditing Office, however, agreed to redeem the municipality’s financial 
status with measures that included forgiving this large debt. The municipality’s landfill 
management lasted until 1993, the same year in which its management was transferred to the 
Municipal Cooperative Agreement (COCIM). COCIM managed the landfill until May 8, 1994, 
at which time José María Figueres was starting his presidential administration and designated a 
Ministry of Special Affairs mainly to provide a solution for the metropolitan rubbish problem. 
The Metropolitan Area includes 30 percent of the country’s population, but only 1.5 
percent of national territory; the resulting population density is 1,600 people per km2. The high 
concentration of population using the landfill, as well as the fact that it is used more as a dump 
than a recycling plant, caused the overuse of the landfill and its subsequent exhaustion. The 
solution proposed by both the municipalities and the central government was to build a new 
landfill. In 1990, it was proposed to transport rubbish by train to Esparza or Orotina, located 
95km from the metropolitan area, or else to Santa Ana, 15 km from the capital. These 
communities, which are not part of the Metropolitan Area, were strongly opposed to the project,   18
and confrontation between the police forces and community members occurred, as well as street 
blockage. The opposition candidate, who was later president, José María Figueres included the 
rubbish treatment problem as a campaign subject. The Calderón Administration opted to 
continue using the Rio Azul landfill instead, and the problem became national, fully out of reach 
of any local solution. 
 
Table 5. Debts and Deficit of the Metropolitan Municipalities with the Executor Unit, 1994-











Total Bailout - 
Total Debt 
Ratio 
Alajuelita  6,367  5,561  22,597  6,950  82.60 
Aserri  -  9,596  10,884  -  76.55 
Coronado  -  -  -  -  49.59 
Curridabat  24,253  30,492  29,101  9,140  95.17 
Desamparados  -  72,336  43,079  49,426  82.39 
Escazu  9,651  13,886  -  -  65.84 
Goicoechea  31,945  32,917  23,956  14,569  76.06 
La Union  -  -  -  -  49.66 
Montes de Oca  -  22,491  -  -  58.75 
Moravia  -  -  -  -  48.1 
San Jose  -  24,156  58,669  235  54.45 
Tibas  -  -  -  -  48.21 
Total  72,216  211,437  188,287  80,231   
Deficit EU  -  286,641  1,172,890  1,236,306   
Deficit to  
Total Revenue EU 







Total Bailout  72,226  498,079  1,361,177  1,316,628  3,248,100 
 
José María Figueres created  the Executor Unit of the Landfill, which took over the 
management and technical closure of the landfill in Rio Azul in May, 1994. Subcontracting a 
company for the treatment and technical closure of the landfill, the Unit took responsibility for 
all administrative matters, paying the company and charging fees to the municipalities that use 
the landfill. The Executor Unit charges the municipalities for the use of the landfill by each 
metric ton deposited which actually includes service of garbage disposal and the technical 
closure of the landfill. COCIM collects the charges from the municipalities and receives a 4 
percent fee for this collection service. 
 
3.2.1.  The Bailout 
   19
The administration of the landfill produced two types of bailouts. The first occurred because 
municipalities did not make full payments of their bills to the Executor Unit. Unpaid amounts 
accumulated over the years, and their nominal value is currently around US$550 thousand.    
The second type of bailout involves deficits accumulated by t he Executor Unit. The 
financial statements of the landfill show large deficits since 1994, which were covered by central 
governments transfers to the Executor Unit. These deficits add up to $3 million over the last five 
years, the same amount transferred to the Executor Unit from the Central government. This 
shortfall in Executor Unit revenues is additionally noteworthy in that the fees charged to the 
municipalities for garbage disposal and technical closure of the landfill are low in comparison to 
the total cost of execution of the landfill. 
In effect, the Central government is assuming the obligations of the Metropolitan Area 
municipalities through direct transfers to the Executor Unit and charging low garbage disposal 
fees to the municipalities.  The details of these deficits are shown in Table 5, which is divided 
into two components. The first part shows the detail of the debts accumulated by the 
municipalities.  The second part details the total amount of the deficit per year and also shows 
these deficits as a percentage of the Executor Unit’s total income.   
The Executor Unit took over responsibility for these debts for various reasons. First, the 
municipal tax discipline law makes it very difficult to include within the budgets of the 
municipalities debts that exceed a one-year expiration date. After a year, the Executor Unit has to 
write off these debts as unrecoverable. Second, the Executor Unit faces serious challenges in 
legal debt recovery, as the Unit must pass the complaint to the Emergency Commission, which is 
its superior body. The Emergency Commission then files the formal complaint before the 
respective court. At the moment, there is no evidence of a single legal complaint filed for non-
payment.  
Third, the low fees do not cover the operation and technical closure of the landfill and 
implicitly call for financial help from the central government. In this case, low fees represent a 
direct subsidy to the local government.
10 
                                                 
10 An examination of the landfill’s financial statements indicates that the Unit is not charging at all for the technical 
closure of the landfill. The research undertaken for this study included a request for more detailed information on the 
Executor Unit’s revenue and expenses in order to more thoroughly evaluate this case, but the chief of the Executor 
Unit considered the information to be classified and confidential and refused to release it.   20
Finally, the legal constitution of the Executing Unit has been unstable since its creation, 
which has complicated debt recuperation. Initially directed by the Ministry of Specific Affairs, 
the Unit was later transferred to the National Emergency Commission during the Figueres 
Administration. In the current Rodríguez Administration, the Unit forms part of the Ministry of 
Health. All of these changes happened within a period of five years. 
 
3.3 The Municipal Development and Advisory Institute (IFAM) 
 
The IFAM, created in 1972 with the purpose of advising local governments by means o f 
directing credit to specific purposes, has been the most important source of credit for local 
governments during the last twenty years. The main characteristics of its loan portfolio are 
shown on Table 6, and the data are divided by administration period in order to observe major 
policy changes. 
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Table 6.   IFAM: Destination, Size and Concentration of Loans 
Item  1982-1986  1986-1990  1990-1994  1994-1998 
                 
Destination  Amount  Number  Amount  Number  Amount  Number  Amount  Number 
Equipment  36%  68%  27  56  46  53  58  60 
Construction  49  24  28  24  13  11  16  14 
Aqueduct  11  5  43  14  37  29  13  11 
Others  4  4  3  6  5  7  13  15 
                 
Size  Amount  Number  Amount  Number  Amount  Number  Amount  Number 
Small  22  32  18  26  16  32  25  36 
Medium  55  47  64  60  58  56  58  55 
Large  23  21  17  14  26  12  18  9 
                 
Concentration  Local 
Governments 
  Local 
Governments 
  Local 
Governments 
  Local 
Governments 
 
0 Loan  7%    22    15    22   
1 Loan  31    30    33    26   
2 Loans  28    28    33    31   
3 + Loans  34    20    19    21   
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Although IFAM regulations do not permit forgiving debts and the Municipal Code does 
not allow the municipalities to be behind in their debts, approximately 85 credit operations in the 
IFAM were identified where the municipality received financial support from this entity due to 
problems in paying their debts.
11 
In the case of the IFAM, the bailout problem leads to very interesting financial behavior. 
As the IFAM cannot forgive debts, the adjustments are made via modification of the original 
terms of credit with the same financial conditions, the suspension of interest and principal 
payments for defined periods, the suspension and later payment of grace period interest and the 
granting of new credit with subsidized financial conditions. 
In such cases the General Auditing Office exclusively corroborates the nominal value, an 
important aspect to be considered for the determinants of the lack of fiscal efforts.  This 
subsection describes the principal bailout episodes involving IFAM. 
 
3.3.1.  Devaluation 1980-1981 
 
In 1980s, Costa Rica faced an aggregate crisis triggered by oil prices and high international 
interest rates, and the country’s long-standing economic   stability came to a sudden end.  After 5 
years with fixed exchange rates (US$1 = 8.6 colones), in 1980 the foreign exchange market 
faced a speculative crisis: the exchange rate devaluated 321 percent, the inflation rate reached 89 
percent and interest rates, which from 1976 to 1979 did not surpass 10 percent in colones terms, 
peaked at 37 percent. The next five years were characterized by 10 percent devaluation and 37 
percent inflation annually. 
At the beginning of the crisis, it was common practice for municipalities to incur indexed 
debt with commercial banks and suppliers denominated in foreign currency and paid in local 
currency, mainly for the purchase of machinery.  Municipalities assumed the exchange rate risk 
involved, as debts were indexed while their income was not. Under these circumstances the 
sudden devaluation led to a severe deterioration in municipalities’ finances, and at least 10 
                                                 
11 These cases were identified through interviews with IFAM employees and by studying approximately 250 credit 
files. Unfortunately, the credit files are not complete, and they do not include some of the executive board 
agreements that relax some of the loan conditions and produce the bailouts as explained below. The Secretary of the 
executive board of IFAM, Gastón Iglesias Montealegre, prevented the authors of this paper from reviewing the 
board’s correspondence.  Even though this is a public matter, we were not able to study the existence of bailouts in 
the full set of loans. Therefore, it was not possible to apply empirical methods to studying the determinants of these 
bailouts.    23
municipalities sought assistance from the IFAM in resolving their financial hardship. One 
particularly interesting case was the municipality of Puntarenas, which was sued for a debt 
incurred in the purchase of machinery. In 1986, the court determined that Puntarenas should pay 
not only the pending amount, but also the legal costs involved. In this case, the IFAM approved a 
loan to allow the municipality to pay this debt. 
In another instance, the municipality of Cartago (the second largest in Costa Rica), 
obtained a loan in 1980 to improve its aqueduct. The municipality argued that it was not able to 
pay its debt because of the devaluation and because of its inability to increase the tariffs. In this 
episode, the IFAM granted the municipality a loan with lower cost conditions and a longer term. 
The loans granted by the IFAM in these cases had longer terms, between 5 and 10 years, with 
lower fixed rates (6 percent in colones) and one-year grace periods.  This bailout is evaluated in 
the same form as the previous cases.  The results are shown in Table 7. 
 







Puntarenas  69,424  60.9 
Pococi  40,425  44.7 
Alajuela  35,448  39.0 
San Carlos  8,910  22.8 
Cartago  8,844  32.6 
Guatuso  6,388  42.2 
Coto Brus  5,406  33.9 
San Rafael  3,768  30.4 
Bagaces  2,160  30.4 
Orotina  2,006  32.6 
Total  $ 182,779   
 
3.3.2.  Municipal Markets 
 
The second bailout episode is the case of the Municipal Markets, a project began at the end of 
the 1980s whose objective was the construction of municipal markets and community centers.  
The resources for financing these works were provided by the Inter-American Development 
Bank through an agreement with IFAM. The loans were granted in the period of 1985-1986 to 12 
local governments and had diverse purposes such as the purchase of land and the construction of 
bus stations. Once these works were built, the sites were rented to the private sector to provide   24
diverse services to the communities.  The original conditions of the loans show terms that vary 
between 16 and 18 years, with fixed annual interest rates of 12 percent for all loans, and 
municipal income established as collateral. The total amount of loans granted was US $1.6 
million in 1986. 
Several reasons explain why the majority of local governments could not meet their 
obligations with the IFAM.  First, serious deficiencies existed throughout the evaluation process 
in each of the projects implemented by the municipalities. A series of flaws are observed in the 
studies carried out in relation to the demand projections used and the income received through 
rent. In other cases feasibility studies were not carried out and there was a low utilization of the 
physical structure.  For instance, in the Colorado municipality (1994) the commercial area of the 
community center was never rented out. In Parrita (1988) the small size of the service-
demanding population stands out, as well as strong competition by the informal sector, which 
affected the profitability of the project. The municipality of Puntarenas faced a similar situation 
(1989) when, two years after opening, its market was occupied at only 27 percent of its capacity. 
Finally, demand and market problems caused the municipality of Acosta to run a deficit of nearly 
1.5 million colones per year in this project. 
A second factor impeding repayment involved problems associated with the tariff 
structures used by the local governments, as well as the effects of inexperience in projects that 
were not normal tasks for either the municipalities or the tenants of the sites.  Third, the 
municipalities were affected by the high rates of default among users of the markets, as well as 
the municipalities’ own limited administrative capacity in revenue collection.  
These situations caused s even of the twelve municipalities involved in the project to 
declare a moratorium on IFAM payments at one time or another. In the majority of the cases 
studied, the IFAM bailout was characterized by the following elements: 
 
1.  Increase in the original term of the loan in some cases up to 7 years in some 
cases, maintaining the same interest rate and without considering moratoria 
interests. 
 
2.  Approval by the Board of Directors of the IFAM for local governments in 
order to defer the interest payment of the grace periods without any additional 
financial cost. The time to fulfill these obligations ranged from 5 to 15 years.   25
In this way, for example, municipalities that had to pay grace period interest with terms 
of one year were allowed to pay the same amounts with longer terms. In other situations, not 
only were the payments of grace period interests deferred, but the grace periods were also 
extended, which affected the recovery of debt. For example, in the case of the Municipality of 
Santa Cruz, in 1988 payment of grace period interests was deferred from the original term of 1.5 
years to 5 years. In the case of the Municipality of Acosta, in 1989 the grace period interests 
were deferred from 1.5 to 10 years, and in 1992 the municipality of Parrita canceled its 
delinquent debt of 1988 by means of a specific allocation. The valuation of the bailout associated 
with the municipal markets, presented in Table 8, follows the same present value approach as the 
previous episodes. 








Acosta  26,083  10.3 
Puntarenas  25,007  8.70 
Parrita  23,521  16.10 
Santa Cruz  12,661  4.00 
Buenos Aires  5,263  2.50 
Colorado  3,241  2.90 
Jimenez     51  0.10 
Total  $95,827   
 
3.3.3.  Aqueducts and Sewage (AYA) 
 
A third episode of IFAM bailout involved the National System of Aqueduct and Sewers Institute 
and the municipalities. Several of the municipalities went into debt with the IFAM to finance the 
construction and maintenance of their aqueducts, which were financed at 6 percent, well below 
the market interest rate.  Since the beginning of the 1990s it has been normal to observe the 
intervention of the AyA and the Ministry of Health in various locations due to problems of 
negative externalities associated with the existence of terrible systems of waste water disposal in 
the municipal aqueducts, as well as the existence of high levels of contamination of potable 
water. Problems involving water rates adjustment and fee structures have subsequently joined 
this list. 
Bailouts have occurred in those cases where the AyA has become the administrator and 
service provider and where municipalities have outstanding debts to the IFAM. When the AyA   26
assumes the administration of the service, it also assumes the debt with the subsidized conditions 
(6 percent rather than the market interest rate).  The value of the bailout and the most relevant 
cases are shown in Table 9. 
 








Mora  227,840  49.4 
San Ramon  29,940  2.30 
Palmares  24,066  2.30 
Nicoya  23,929  - 
Colorado  18,408  51.20 
Santa Cruz  12,596  - 
Limon  9,657  1.70 
San Pablo  6,928  2.60 
Coto Brus  2,318  1.70 
Aguirre  1926  1.50 
Perez Zeledon  1,007  1.70 
Total  $356,928   
 
For this reason the quantification of the bailout includes not only the debts that the IFAM 
had to assume, but also the fact that once the system of aqueducts and sewers is taken over by the 
AyA, the finance conditions remain subsidized. Particularly noteworthy are Mora and Colorado, 
where the bailout represented close to 50 percent of the total debt incurred by the local 
government. These two cases received ample public coverage in Costa Rica due to epidemics of 
hepatitis and the presence of fecal matter in potable water supplies. 
 
3.4  Determinants of Bailouts 
 
Bailouts in Costa Rica result from the high political cost to the central government of ignoring 
local government fiscal problems and the local governments’ adjustment costs in dealing with 
the crises themselves. This section explains the main determinants of bailouts in detail. 
 
3.4.1  Factors Affecting Local Governments’ Cost of Adjustment 
 
The factors affecting the cost of adjustment for the lower government in the absence of a bailout 
represent the first determinant of these events. The g overnment of Costa Rica is highly   27
centralized, with local jurisdictions performing very few activities. Moreover, intergovernmental 
fiscal relations are characterized by a low degree of vertical imbalance and high rigidity of 
revenue and expenditure on the side of local governments. These factors affect the bailout 
decision, since the higher-level government cares about the welfare of the citizens of the 
jurisdiction to be rescued. 
The cases of aqueducts, devaluation and landfill all demonstrate the rigidity of municipal 
revenues. In the episode of the aqueduct of Cartago, Paraiso and Oreamuno, for instance, the 
AyA advised a 60-percent increase in water rates, which was ultimately rejected. In the case of 
the devaluation, the delay involved in approving these fees makes it difficult to use them as a 
solution to the problem, and depending on the central government to finance the default is 
always simpler. Finally, in the case of the landfill, municipalities found it easier to be bailed out 
by the Executor’s Office than to adjust garbage disposal rates in their jurisdictions. An important 
fact explaining this rigidity of service fees is the political cost to the municipal council. Since the 
communities are generally small, and most of the municipal council members live in the 
community, a large fee increase can affect members’ prospects in future campaigns, as the 
adjustment in service charges can always be traced to the Municipal Council. 
 
3.4.2   Political Cost for the Higher-Level Government 
 
A second determinant of bailouts in Costa Rica is the high cost to the central government 
associated with not extending a bailout. As Costa Rica is a unitary republic with a high degree of 
centralization, most decisions can be traced to the central government. Three specific factors 
affect the central government’s political benefit in denying bailouts: the proximity of elections, 
the central government’s ultimate responsibility for problems left unsolved by local 
governments, and the weakness of legal restrictions. 
 
3.4.3.  Election Period 
 
The high political cost of not extending a bailout in the episodes of the Rio Azul Landfill and the 
aqueduct in Cartago derived from the proximity of these events to an election. The candidate for 
the leading party during the election of 1994-1998, José María Figueres, made use of the landfill 
problem as a campaign issue. The bailout, which occurred after the election, was a direct result 
of a promise made by the president during his campaign.  One can argue for ex-ante behavior   28
from the local governments that translated afterwards into reducing the payments to the central 
government for the landfill service. In the case of the aqueduct of Cartago, the executive and 
legislative branches assessed the high political costs of denying the bailout. In the executive 
branch, the AyA, whose executive president is chosen by the President of the Republic, accepted 
a four-year postponement in payments by local governments. Considering that Cartago is the 
second largest jurisdiction of the country and t hat elections were tight during the last two 
campaigns, denying the bailout could have affected the electoral results at the higher government 
level. 
The legislative branch extended the bailout in exchange for a favorable vote in Congress 
on the part of a minority deputy. In 1996, the election of the president of the legislative assembly 
required one extra vote to assure this position, and it was widely recognized that the minority 
deputy representing the region of Cartago negotiated an amount in specific allocation above 
US$1 million for the aqueduct of Cartago in exchange for his vote. 
 
3.4.4   Flaws in the Legal System 
 
Since Costa Rica is a small, very centralized country, denying a bailout bears a high political 
cost, because any resulting can be traced to the government’s action. Not only is the central 
government responsible for solving the problems of the country, but it is also frequently 
perceived by the population as the cause of those difficulties. The problem of the devaluation of 
1982, the overuse of the landfill in the metropolitan area, the deterioration of the aqueducts and 
sewage system across the country and the inappropriate evaluation of the municipal markets are 
all examples of local problems that can be traced to central government actions. Mass media play 
an important role in transforming these local level problems into national difficulties. 
The weakness of the legal system represents a final determinant of these episodes. 
Bailouts of debt are a mechanism to transfer local fiscal obligations to the central government. 
Consequently, if local governments perceive flaws in the legal system regarding debt 
enforcement, they will carry out ex-ante overspending, recognizing that the central government 
will periodically bail them out. The cost of denying a bailout in this case becomes high since the 
laws in force mix the responsibilities of the different actors. 
The General Auditing Office works under a nominal value of debt. Thus, no matter how 
long loan recovery takes for the IFAM, the Office will control the nominal value of the loan. The   29
IFAM has the right, though, to extend the terms of the loan while maintaining the interest rate 
and original amount as a procedure to extend a bailout. This practice has produced implicit 
bailouts in Costa Rica. A parallel problem occurs with the landfill where debts more than one 
year old cannot be included in the budget. The Executor Unit of the landfill must then either 
accept this default as a bailout or undertake legal action with no clear precedent and little chance 
of success. 
Although the Municipal Code establishes that municipalities will take care of the well-
being of the inhabitants of its territory, a series of laws creating autonomous institutions has 
mixed the responsibilities of the different actors. The AyA, for instance, must guarantee the 
provision of potable water across the nation. Although this was merely a supervisory duty when 
the institution was established, the AyA rapidly transformed into an executor unit and finally a 
supplier provider c overing approximately 50 percent of the country’s municipalities. This 
mixture of duties reflects the weakness of the legal system and explains the bailout episode in 
Cartago, which occurred because the Municipality of Cartago and the AyA did not reach an 
agreement in terms of acceptance of the project.  The AyA had particular interests in undertaking 
the administration of the aqueduct since the province of Cartago is the main source of water for 
the Metropolitan Area. The municipality finally maintained the administration and resumed 
payments five years later. 
The failure to define the scale at which these goods and services were to be provided 
represents a key factor in explaining the duplication of functions.  While it is clear that the 
provision of water and the service of garbage collection and disposal have important economies 
of scale, the question here is whether people desire to join in the large-scale provision of the 
service. This decision results from the comparison between the benefit received by the reduction 
in the cost of provision due to larger scales and the losses that arise from people’s inability to 
control their own service levels. If such losses were not present, the result would be central 
provision (see King, 1984 and 1997). For the cases studied in this paper, this duality is present in 
the form of two opposite institutions.  
Consider first the case of water. Historically, local governments were supposed to 
provide potable water, with the territory divided into 81 local governments. The development of 
the Metropolitan Area, however, with its concentration of population and scarcity of water, 
demanded a unified approach. Hence, the provision of water in the country changed and now   30
several main sources supply water to the country.  The takeover of service by AyA in some 
localities reflects the economy of scale in the provision of the good. Alternatively, several 
localities have refused to transfer the service from the municipality to the AyA, reflecting the 
high losses they perceive from this transference. In some cases this duality of provision and 
public institutions is understood as a weakness in the legal system, which increases the 
likelihood of a bailout.  
The episode of Cartago and the cases of the aqueduct of the IFAM are examples of this 
economy of scale dilemma. In the IFAM cases, provision was transferred to the AyA and the 
bailout occurred. In the Cartago episode, the opposite occurred. Cartago had sufficient water 
resources to expand water provision and decrease costs by itself, and the losses for transferring 
the service to the AyA turned out to be very high. As a result of the conflict of interest, there was 
a 5-year delay that produced the bailout. 
A similar analysis applies to the case of the landfill. The problem of garbage disposal 
exceeds the boundaries of each community in the Metropolitan Area, and the municipalities 
decided to collaborate in order to provide for the disposal of garbage in a single location. They 
received the benefit of a very low cost, given the economies of scale present. Nevertheless, the 
expansion of the Metropolitan Area increases the losses that arise from people’s inability to 
control their own service level. In this case, the municipalities find it very costly to carry out 
garbage removal. The duplication of functions by the executor unit and the municipalities, and 
the need to determine the scale of service provision, reveals a weakness in the legal system that 




4.  The Specific Allocations 
  
The Specific Allocations (Partidas Específicas in Spanish) are public resources from the National 
Budget of the Republic distributed by the deputies in the Legislative Assembly for local, 
communal or regional public needs. They are to be used in public works such as infrastructure 
                                                 
12 This problem is becoming hard to solve. Presently, many of the solutions that call for providing the service by 
means of including a smaller number of municipalities in the Metropolitan Area are being refused by all localities. 
Since municipalities cannot solve the free rider problem, it seems that each local government will have to dispose of 
its own garbage.  It is at that moment it is expected that the high cost of disposal will create an opportunity for 
shared provision of service.   31
(road and sewer repair), recreation (sports facilities, gymnasiums and parks) and social and 
cultural projects (education and health). The beneficiaries have principally been  communal 
organizations such as municipalities, development associations, educational boards and other 
groups. 
The reason to study the distribution of specific allocations is that they have been highly 
discretionary, and they may provide a hidden channel for the central government to provide 
bailouts, or soften the budget constraints on municipalities.  The empirical section below tests 
this hypothesis in order to conclude whether specific allocations are a hidden mechanism for the 
central government to bail out municipalities.  
 
Table 10.  Specific Allocations (SA) to Municipalities 1990-1997 




SA in Total 
Revenue 
Terms 
1990  32.1%  -  3.0% 
1991  16.4  48.8  3.5 
1992  42.3  269.8  10.1 
1993  24.4  -35.9  4.9 
1994  37.1  -51.7  2.1 
1995  31.8  268.9  6.5 
1996  32.1  31.5  5.8 
1997  29.6  -0.6  4.4 
 
Although SAs are not reported in the budget of local governments, they are an important 
source of additional revenue for municipalities, especially as SAs can be distributed to other 
social organizations. Table 10 describes trends in specific allocations. The first column of the 
table indicates the share of the total allocations that were directed to the municipalities, the 
second represents the growth rate of the SA, and the third reflects the amount of the allocations 
to municipalities as a percentage of total municipal revenue. 
The table shows the overwhelming volatility of these transfers. The fraction going to 
municipalities rises from 16.4 percent in 1991 to 42.3 percent in 1992, an election year, when the 
total amount of SAs almost tripled. But, while this is the most extreme increase, high variability 
is also present in other years. Due to their discretionary nature, the allocation of these resources 
is highly dependent on national politics and sensitive to innovations in the Legislative Assembly. 
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4.1 Political Process behind the Specific Allocations 
 
The large volatility of these transfers documented in the previous section illustrates the high 
degree of discretionality in municipalities’ access to resources from the National Budget. Until 
May of 1998, the process for the approval and execution of SA was as follows: the Treasury 
Department of the Ministry of Finance proposed the bills for the ordinary and extraordinary 
budget of the Republic. Specifically, the Treasury Department budgets a maximum amount for 
SAs according to the fiscal and monetary program. The Treasury Commission (Comisión de 
Asuntos Hacendarios) of the Legislative Assembly must discuss, modify and approve the budget. 
The Commission, made up of 11 deputies—including a member from the minority parties—is 
elected by the President of the Legislative Assembly. The effect of national politics is clear, 
since the President of the Congress is almost always a deputy of the party that controls the 
Executive branch. The SA bill is revised and modified by a sub-commission composed of 5 
members. Once the Commission approves the budget, it is sent to the Plenary of the Assembly to 
be voted on and made Law of the Republic. 
As expected, the Commission invariably increases the amount of SA, even at the cost of 
cutting expenses from other divisions of the government. Table 11 shows the amounts proposed 
by the Ministry of Finance and the amounts finally approved by the Treasury Commission for a 
selected set of years. In several years the Ministry of Finance did not budget specific allocations 
but in one of those years the Legislative Assembly approved sums above $17 million. 
 
Table 11.  Amount of Specific Allocations, 1994-1998 
(in million of dollars) 
  Proposed:  Approved: 




1994  0  4.7 
1995  0  17.6 
1996  14.4  19.9 
1997  15.1  19.1 
 
Moreover, due to their presence in the commission, some minority deputies can receive 
larger SA amounts in exchange for supporting the initiatives and position of the ruling party. The 
best-known case is that of Brenes Castillo from Cartago. His party has been particularly effective   33
in obtaining resources from the ruling party in exchange for supporting legislation favored by the 
Executive branch. 
Figure 3 plots the amount of SA assigned by deputy during the last four administrations. 
The share of total allocations distributed by each deputy during the administration is calculated. 
The deputies are then ranked in descending order, and the percentage, distributed by each rank, is 
reported in the vertical axis. Particularly striking is the regularity of the relative allocations 
across different administrations.  Almost all administrations show the same concentration per 
deputy in distributing SA.  
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For instance, seven deputies distribute 50 percent of the total local government specific 
allocations in each administration.  The connections of each municipality with the deputies in the 
Congress are a key determinant of the amount of resources they obtain from the National Budget.  
It is also true from the data that certain municipalities receive larger amounts of SA due to the 
presence of a major deputy in the Assembly.  Although this relationship is informal, one would 
like to test for this relationship as well as testing whether political networks impact the amount of 
specific allocations received.  Furthermore, one would like to address the question of whether 
this institutional framework translates into fiscal indiscipline and represents a source of hidden 
bailouts.   
Although the relationship between politics and the allocation of SAs is not the main issue 
of this paper, this evidence helps to understand how and why discretionary transfers from the 
central government encourage or reward municipalities’ fiscal indiscipline and thus constitute 
hidden bailouts.  Before describing the empirical tests, however, it is necessary to mention recent 
changes in legislation that reduced the discretionary character of these transfers. 
 
4.2.  Recent Reforms 
 
The distribution of specific allocation has been the subject of much public debate, and many 
attempts at reform took place during the period studied in this paper.
13 The allocation of these 
grants was regulated by means of presidential decrees, mainly those promulgated in 1985, 1987 
and 1991
14 before the Law of Specific Allocations was promulgated in April 1998. 
The first decree enabled the Treasury Department to follow up on the process of 
allocation, delivery and control of the transfers. The funds are emitted by the National Treasury 
and issued directly to authorized individuals or deputies in the legislature, and it previously was 
customary for community representatives or deputies to withdraw the funds and personally 
deliver them. In 1987, a second decree improved the control mechanisms, as on many occasions 
                                                 
13 Many of the projects proposed at the end of the 1980s, especially by the Decentralization Commission, CORECA, 
were rejected by the Congress during the Calderón Administration of 1990-1994.  It was not until the Figueres 
Administration, 1994-1998, that the New Municipal Code and the Real Estate Law were approved.  In fact, when 
Oscar Arias was the Minister of Planning in the Oduber Administration 1974-1978, he proposed one of the most 
daring projects of decentralization ever seen. He proposed that local governments had a minimum of 10 percent 
participation in the total government expenditure. The project was rejected in the Legislative Assembly.  It is 
important to add to this paper that this 10 percent participation project has been recently approved.  
14 Decree numbers mentioned are 16742-H of November 11, 1985, 17796-H of October 22, 1987, 20720= H -
MIDEPLAN and Law No 7755.   35
the allocated funds did not appear to have been deposited in the beneficiary’s account.  This 
decree required that proof of delivery of funds should be delivered to the to the Treasury 
Department within 60 days of receipt, but the process continued to lack adequate technical 
control, as only a letter from a Representative was necessary to process a specific allocation. In 
1991, a third decree established that the interested entity should submit an expenditure plan to 
the Treasury Department for allocations greater than $2,450. Reports of the project progress 
should follow the assignment of the transfers four months later. Moreover, the General Auditing 
Office should audit those SAs whose amounts exceed US$40,850. This decree enabled the 
Legislative Assembly to modify the destination of the SAs in the Extraordinary Budget as long 
as the funds had not already been delivered to their beneficiaries.   
The 1998 Law of Control of Specific Allocations rescinded the 1991 decree and declared 
that those municipalities and private entities best complying with a new set of requirements will 
benefit from these grants. These new criteria include technical financial analysis, adequate 
spending and control plans as well as studies justifying the financial needs of the communities 
and the municipal inability to meet those needs. Currently, the Central government defines the 
national amount to be distributed, and a Mixed Commission, composed of three members 
appointed by the Central government and two members named by local governments, evaluates 
and approves the project proposals. The three key variables are the number of inhabitants, 
geographical extension and the poverty index.  Deputies, however, still have the power to modify 
programs and carry out transfers.  
 
5.  Specific Allocations as a Channel for Hidden Bailouts 
 
5.1.  Motivation and Main Results 
 
What relationship should one expect between the deficit of a municipality and the SA that it 
receives? In theory, there is no clear relationship. On the one hand, if specific allocations could 
be used to pay local government debt, then municipalities would have incentives to incur debt 
and then request assistance from legislators and the central government for assistance.  Thus, one 
would expect a negative relationship between surplus and SA.  
The opposite case can be made as well. Consider a case in which SA resources cannot be 
used to repay municipal debts.  Instead, the use of SA is decided directly by the congressman 
according to his assessment of the needs of the locality, and municipalities would simply serve to   36
carry out the project. Then, it is quite possible that if a municipality receives additional resources 
it would have less incentive to incur debts, because now one of the local needs is being covered 
directly by the SA. 
Therefore, the key consideration is whether municipalities can influence the amount and 
use of SAs, which would let them use SAs as a substitute for their own revenue. While the law 
indicates does not seem to allow for a direct substitution, in practice municipalities could lobby 
deputies for assistance. The SAs obtained would thus release resources from their budgets, 
effectively substituting for the fiscal efforts of the municipality. 
This section addresses the question of substitution and empirically determines what 
relation is observed.  The purpose is to evaluate whether there exists an informal institutional 
framework that allows local governments to soften their budget constraints and pursue fiscal 
indiscipline under the assumption that central government will rescue them.  The results suggest 
a positive relationship between SAs and municipal surpluses; it would appear that, given the 
rigidity of revenues, municipalities lower their direct expenditures when a SA is received by the 
cantón.   
This section attempts to assess the effect of different variables in determining the amount 
of discretionary transfers and the interaction of these transfers with the deficit of municipalities. 
There is annual information on the 81 cantones from the years running from 1982 to 1997, for a 
total of 1,215 municipality-year observations.
15  The database compiled contains a wide set of 
demographic, economic and political variables for each cantón.
16 It should additionally be noted 
that this sections considers SAs, as opposed to direct transfers from the Central Government, 
because SAs are much more discretionary.   
As noted above, the per capita amount of specific allocations granted to municipalities 
varies considerably across municipalities and over time.  The ratio of the cross-municipality 
standard deviation to the average per capita allocation received across municipalities ranges from 
$0.63 to $2.38 during the sample period. 1981 has the lowest dispersion: municipalities received 
on average $8.5 per capita, with a standard deviation of $5.34. But even then, the disparity is 
significant: while San Mateo, Puntarenas, received $25.30 per inhabitant, the inhabitants of 
                                                 
15 The authors are indebted to Alexandra Mora, the Chief of the Specific Allocation Department of the Treasury 
Ministry, for making available the reports of each specific allocation distributed since 1983. Her patience in 
collecting these documents during the last sixteen years has made it possible the study these grants.  Of course, the 
authors are responsible for any errors or omissions in processing these reports. 
16 The variables are defined in the Appendix.   37
Garabito, Puntarenas, did not receive anything at all. The inequality among municipalities is the 
highest in 1993. Then, Parrita received $42.40 dollars in comparison to the $0.01 received in 
Aserrí, while seven other localities received nothing. Examination of the data also indicates that 
the skewedness is very high: SAs are very low for a large fraction of the municipalities but very 
high for a few. 
Instead of looking at each of the cases, the present objective is to determine statistically 
the effect of different variables, in particular the degree of discipline of the local government as 
measured by the financial surplus.  To this end, this section employs simple and familiar 
econometric methods to assess the impact of observable variables on the amount of these 
discretionary transfers that municipalities receive. 
 
5.2.  Econometric Specifications 
 
This section has two objectives. The first is to discern whether there is a relationship between 
transfers and municipal surpluses of the municipalities, and the second is to gauge the relevance 
of different variables in determining the amount of discretionary transfers. It should be 
emphasized, though, that the results must be seen as a first step. A full-fledged econometric 
investigation of these issues, which lies well beyond the scope of this paper, will be undertaken 
by the authors in a separate study. 
To assess the effect of the fiscal surplus of the local governments and the other variables 
described below on the amount of specific allocations received, a model is used in which  it sac , 







t i it surc x x sac e g b a a + + + + =  
 
The observable explicative variables are the two vectors 
a
t x ,  it x ;  it e  is a random 
disturbance that captures the unobservable variables.  Here, 
a
t x  is a vector common to all local 
governments at time t, and  it x  is a vector of variables that may differ across municipalities. 
To establish whether SA are related to the fiscal efforts and outcomes of the 
municipalities, explicitly included is a measure  it surc  of the surplus of the municipalities. Here, 
0 > it surc  indicates that the municipality i had a surplus at time t.  It is measured as a fraction of 
the municipality’s revenue.   38
One must consider, however, that the fiscal outcome of the municipalities is the outcome 
of a political process, including the relationship of the local council with the national 
government. The surplus or deficit would also respond to the needs of the moment and the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the locality. The must obvious way to address this possibility is 







t i it sac z z surc e g b a a + + + + =  
 
where, as before, 
a
t z ,  it z  are common and specific observables of the municipalities. The RHS 
variables  may or may not coincide with 
a
t x ,  it x . Specifying this system of simultaneous 
regressions allows for the possibility of feedback between SAs and deficits. 
This is a system of two simultaneous equations, as estimating each regression while 
ignoring simultaneity would render inconsistent estimators.  Obviously, if the set of observable 
variables is the same for the two regressions, this system of simultaneous equations cannot be 
identified. With additional restrictions (e.g., a priori zero restrictions), one or both equations 




One contribution of this study is to assemble an exhaustive database on the cantones of Costa 
Rica. The database includes the financial information on the municipalities, local electoral 
outcomes, and demographic and socioeconomic variables for every canton from 1980 to 1997. 
Most notably included are the values of SAs and the names of the deputies who assigned them. 
There is also data on direct transfers from the Ministry of Finance. 
The information is taken from various sources. SAs were drawn from printed memos in 
the Legislative Assembly and the Ministry of Finance, and the revenues, expenditures and 
deficits of local governments were obtained from the General Auditing Office. Electoral 
outcomes were obtained from the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Information on the average 
wages and total wage bill were obtained from the Caja Costarricense de Seguridad Social 
(CCSS). All other demographic and socioeconomic variables were obtained from a database 
provided by the School of Statistics of the Universidad de Costa Rica. A detailed description of 
the data appears is in the Appendix. 
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5.4. Results 
 
Specific allocations (SACY) and the surplus of the municipalities (SURCY) are expressed as a 
fraction of the revenue of the municipalities. The regressions include dummies for the 
Administration using Figueres as the base. They also control for the year of the administration, 
by including dummies indicating whether the administration is in the first, second or third year 
(FYA,  SYA, and  TYA). Also included are variables on the financing structure of the local 
government such as the flexibility of revenue (FOR) and the vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI). The 
regression further includes socioeconomic and demographic variables such as Rwage and POP, 
the real average wage and the population of the cantón. Other variables were included, but they 
are not reported, as none proved significant. Additionally used were indicators of the aggregate 
economy such as  TCRGDP and SURGDP, the rate of growth of Costa Rican GDP and the 
Surplus of the Central Government as a fraction of the GDP, respectively.  
Last and certainly not least is the dummy  POL, which takes the value of 1 if the 
municipal council is dominated by the party that leads the Central Government, and zero 
otherwise. Two variables attempt to measure the connections of the municipality with the 
Congress. The first, SUBCOM, is a dummy indicating whether cantón i received an SA at time t 
from a Congressman who is a member of the Subcomisión de Hacendarios, which has direct 
control over SAs. The second variable, M2PC, is motivated by the concentration observed in the 
allocation of SA. The variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the municipality receives, in a 
given period, SAs from a single legislator that surpass 2 percent of the national total.  




i a : treating them as 
common across municipalities (OLS), regressions including fixed effects (Fixed), and random 
effects (Random). Table 12 shows the results when the LHS variable is SACY. Table 13 does the 
same, but uses municipal deficits as the LHS variable. Both tables have six columns because the 
exercises are performed twice, first using SURCY, the global surplus of the municipality and 
second using SURCY, the surplus subtracting the transfers and grants allocated by the Ministerio 
de Hacienda (remember that they are different from SA). The numbers in parenthesis are the t-
statistics, which, whenever possible, were calculated using the Arellano-White consistent 
standard errors.
17 
                                                 
17 In the cases where the Arellano-White covariance matrix was not definite, OLS errors were used.   40
The results point to a positive relationship between SAs and municipal surpluses, as 
reported in Tables 12 and 13. It appears that, given the rigidity of the revenues, municipalities 
lower their direct expenditures when the  cantón receives an SA. The positive association 
between the municipal surplus and the SA received by the cantón is reflected by the positive and 
significant coefficients in the two set of regressions, as reported in both tables.  
 
Table 12.  Specific Allocations as % of Municipality Income:  Single Equation Models 
 
Variable  SACY 
  SURY  SURCY 
  OLS  Fixed  Random  OLS  Fixed  Random 
SURY  0.0671  0.0658  0.0659       
  (2.925)  (1.746)  (3.148)       
SURCY        0.0432  0.0583  0.0542 
        (2.064)  (1.690)  (2.807) 
M2PC  0.2639  0.2641  0.2633  0.2657  0.2654  0.2647 
  (14.374)  (9.564)  (14.863)  (14.46)  (-9.560)  (14.956) 
SUBCOM  0.0294  0.0385  0.0365  0.0290  0.0391  0.0369 
  (1.591)  (1.506)  (2.105)  (1.567)  (1.504)  (2.124) 
MONGE  -0.1508  -0.1403  -0.1517  -0.1395  -0.1276  -0.1408 
  (-2.46)  (-0.686)  (-2.695)  (-2.277)  (-0.608)  (-2.505) 
ARIAS  -0.0734  -0.0568  -0.0691  -0.0720  -0.0528  -0.0668 
  (-1.757)  (-0.396)  (-1.781)  (-1.1719)  (-0.356)  (-1.720) 
CALDERON  -0.1198  -1.1024  -1.1122  -0.1188  -0.0997  -1.1104 
  (-3.263)  (-1.437)  (-3.248)  (-3.227)  (-1.362)  (-3.193) 
FYA  -0.0947  -0.0900  -0.0935  -0.0941  -0.0855  -0.0904 
  (-3.428)  (-1.352)  (-3.690)  (-3.374)  (-1.210)  (-3.537) 
SYA  -0.0033  -0.0061  -0.0075  -0.0016  -0.0046  -0.0062 
  (-0.16)  (-0.158)  (-0.393)  (-0.078)  (-0.118)  (-0.325) 
TYA  -0.0235  -0.0198  -0.0222  -0.0246  -0.0189  -0.0218 
  (-1.034)  (-0.798)  (-1.066)  (-1.078)  (-0.727)  (-1.048) 
POL  0.0615  0.0412  0.0459  0.0613  0.0415  0.0459 
  (3.667)  (1.191)  (2.726)  (3.651)  (1.183)  (2.723) 
VFI  -0.0005  0.0002  0.0000  -0.0004  0.0002  0.0001 
  (-0.949)  (0.202)  (0.082)  (-0.871)  (0.271)  (0.195) 
FOR  -0.0008  0.0006  0.0002  -0.0008  0.0007  0.0002 
  (-1.020)  (0.329)  (0.251)  (-1.017)  (0.339)  (0.275) 
POP  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  (-7.926)  (-0.036)  (-4.426)  (-7.993)  (-0.027)  (-4.434) 
RWAGE  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  (-3.019)  (0.257)  (-1.597)  (-3.072)  (-0.257)  (-1.612) 
TCRGDP  -0.1405  -0.1567  -0.1515  -0.1292  -0.1637  -0.1537 
  (-1.168)  (-1.431)  (-1.382)  (-1.068)  (-1.426)  (-1.395) 
DEFGDP  2.3207  2.5012  2.4647  2.2745  2.5113  2.4571 
  (2.089)  (1.504)  (2.419)  (2.043)  (1.467)  (-2.410) 
Constant  0.4128    0.3587  0.4159    0.3610 
  (5.641)    (4.605)  (5.668)    (4.627) 
2 R   0.2568  0.4280  0.2543  0.2540  0.4275  0.2511 
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Table 13. Municipal Deficits as % of Municipality Income: Single Equation Models 
 
Variable  SURY  SURCY 
  OLS  Fixed  Random  OLS  Fixed  Random 
SACY  0.1133  0.1430  0.1181  0.0880  0.1481  0.1230 
  (2.925)  (1.768)  (2.882)  (2.064)  (1.698)  (2.616) 
M2PC  0.0209  0.0240  0.0219  0.0145  0.0073  0.0121 
  (0.807)  (0.602)  (0.803)  (0.507)  (0.156)  (0.397) 
SUBCOM  -0.0411  -0.0421  -0.0413  -0.0530  -0.0579  -0.0560 
  (-1.711)  (-1.440)  (-1.655)  (-2.005)  (-1.642)  (-2.032) 
MONGE  0.1758  0.1794  0.1762  0.0005  -0.0171  0.0084 
  (2.206)  (-0.640)  (2.139)  (0.005)  (-0.043)  (0.093) 
ARIAS  -0.0137  -0.0243  -0.0145  -0.0604  -0.0966  -00659 
  (-0.253)  (-0.125)  (-0.258)  (-1.010)  (-0.350)  (-1.069) 
CALDERON  -0.0058  -0.0174  -0.0063  -0.0437  -0.0668  -0.0475 
  (-0.120)  (-0.176)  (-0.127)  (-0.827)  (-0.522)  (-0.865) 
FYA  -0.1205  -0.1199  -0.1205  -0.2106  -0.2151  -0.2084 
  (-3.356)  (-1.408)  (-3.246)  (-5.327)  (-1.846)  (-5.159) 
SYA  0.0373  0.0334  0.0370  0.0184  0.0126  0.0186 
  (1.378)  (0.378)  (1.322)  (0.617)  (0.199)  (0.612) 
TYA  -0.0852  -0.0895  -0.0855  -0.1099  -0.1178  -0.1122 
  (-2.896)  (-2.413)  (-2.812)  (-3.396)  (-2.645)  (-3.398) 
POL  -0.0048  -0.0028  -0.0048  0.0015  -0.0074  -0.0034 
  (-0.220)  (-0.059)  (-0.208)  (0.061)  (-0.133)  (-0.128) 
VFI  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0001 
  (-1.070)  (0.663)  (1.003)  (0.217)  (-0.257)  (-0.167) 
FOR  0.0002  -0.0003  0.0001  0.0002  -0.0010  -0.0003 
  (0.163)  (-0.123)  (0.101)  (0.158)  (-0.277)  (-0.279) 
POP  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  (0.197)  (0.031)  (0.237)  (1.102)  (-0.051)  (0.828) 
RWAGE  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  (-0.472)  (-0.418)  (-0.52)  (0.081)  (-0.353)  (-0.548) 
TCRGDP  0.8847  0.8951  0.8861  1.1059  1.1299  1.1181 
  (5.739)  (5.415)  (5.567)  (6.517)  (5.701)  (6.488) 
DEFGDP  -2.9404  -2.9444  -2.9536  -3.3125  -3.4682  -3.4005 
  (-2.036)  (-1.708)  (-1978)  -(2.083)  (-1.535)  (-2.095) 
Constant  -0.0939    -0.0899  -0.1820    -0.1297 
  (-0.974)    (-0.882)  (-1.715)    (-1.077) 
2 R   0.0627  0.0725  0.0627  0.0866  0.1266  0.0849 
 
 
However, if there is a positive and significant link on both sides, the estimates reported in 
these two tables are inconsistent, as is well known from basic econometrics. In order to 
overcome this problem and to identify the equations, one must add structure to the system of 
equations.  The usual method is to impose zero constraints: variables that enter only in a subset 
of the equations. Before entering into this simultaneous equation discussion and the proposed 
solution, though, it is useful to summarize the set of results explaining the allocation of these 
specific grants.     42
A first consideration involves some common patterns that are robust across regressions. 
The fixed effects model, as it includes more variables, has better goodness of fit and, in general, 
gives higher significance to the regressors. Variables that are statistically significantly different 
from zero in the OLS and random effects model lose their significance in the fixed effects model. 
This suggests that much of the variation in the sample data is contained across municipalities and 
not across periods. This is to say, municipality dummies capture the effect of the idiosyncratic 
variables. 
Differences across Administrations were noted in previous sections, and they are 
captured in the regressions as well. The most significant cases are those of the Monge and 
Calderón administrations, and to lesser extent the Arias administration, with respect to Figueres. 
These differences reflect differences in the style and objectives of the President, as well as 
different macroeconomic conditions and, of course, the composition of the Congress. This last 
element has particular importance, as SAs have consistently been used by the Party in power to 
gain support from independent and opposition members of Congress. It should also be noted that 
the regressions show that differences across Administrations are more pronounced and more 
significant for SAs than for deficits. 
The regressions also indicate the presence of electoral cycles in funding. SAs are 
significantly lower in the first year of the administration. For the second and third year, they 
seem lower, but that cannot be established at the conventional levels of significance. 
Interestingly, municipal surpluses also display a cycle associated with the election of the council, 
as the surplus is significantly lower during the first three years. The estimates are significant and 
indicate that municipalities increase their deficit during the election year. 
The effect of political variables revealed by the regression results is points not only to the 
electoral cycle.  First, and perhaps not too surprising, the two variables, M2PC and SUBCOM 
both indicate that the connections of the municipalities with the Congress are important 
determinants of the SA received. Second, and more interesting, the interaction of the local and 
national political variables is significant. Notice that the dummy POL is positive and significant 
in the regression of for SACY. Thus, municipalities with Council dominated by the party in 
Power at the national level receive more specific allocations. It seems clear that Congressmen 
from the government tend to favor the localities that are governed by their own party.    43
The regressions also suggest a redistributive role assigned to the SA. The estimates 
indicate a negative relation between the SA received by a municipality with the average wage 
(RWAGE) of the cantón and with the size of its population. Thus, rural poor areas are receiving 
more SAs as a fraction of their own revenue. Financing variables of the municipalities such as 
VFI and FOR are not significant in either set of regressions. This results from their low cross-
sectional variability in the sampled data. In addition, undue meaning should not be attributed to 
the results on the aggregate variables TCRGDP and SURGDP, as these variables had strong 
differences across periods and across Administrations. While some of these are controlled for, 
the series are not long enough to provide information not captured by the administration 
dummies and electoral years dummies. 
The results for regressions on surplus are much less conclusive. Indeed, the overall 
goodness of fit is much, much lower than those in the regressions of SA.  Moreover, the 
regressors have lower significance than in the SA regressions. Both the low goodness of fit and 
lack of significance are common using different definitions for the surplus, such as per capita 
surplus and surplus as fraction of the labor earnings of the cantón. This is illustrated in the table 
by showing in the table the results using the surplus series net of other grants from the Central 
government (SURY).  All the previous results are robust to different specifications, including the 
use of measures of SA and surplus per capita terms and as a fraction of total cantón labor 
revenue.   
Turning to the relationship between SAs and local government surpluses, the results 
pointed to a positive relationship between SAs and municipal surpluses, which produces a 
simultaneity problem.  The usual method to address this is to impose zero constraints and, 


































t i it sac x x x surc e g b b a a + + + + + =  
 
As long as 
d x , 
s x  are disjoint and both not empty, the two equations are identified. 
Familiar TSLS methods can be used to estimate the equations consistently. The obvious question 
is then how to select these two sets of variables. Without an economic model, this answer cannot 
be answered in a completely satisfactory manner. Table 14 shows the results of the following 
identification assumption. First, it is assumed that  ) 1 (- = sury x
d , i.e., the lagged value of the   44
surplus is used as an instrument of current municipal surplus. This is quite common practice. 
Second, it is assumed 
s x = [pol, M2PC, sacy(-1)]. The first two were not significant in the simple 
regression on surcy as shown in Table 13. Using lagged values as sacy(-1) is a common practice. 
 
Table 14. Specific Allocations and Municipal Deficits as % of Municipality Income: 
TSLS of Simultaneous Models 
Variable  SACY  SURY 
  OLS  Fixed  Random  OLS  Fixed  Random 
SURY  0.2263  0.1878  0.2012       
  (4.815)  (2.520)  (4.544)       
SACY (-1)  0.1900  0.0014  0.0713       
  (-7.180)  (0.028)  (-2.680)       
POL  0.0465  0.0413  0.0434       
  (2.822)  (-1.200)  (2.606)       
M2PC  0.2478  0.2619  0.2573       
  (13.751)  (9.503)  (14.636)       
SACY        0.0472  0.1006  0.0541 
        (0.908)  (0.578)  (0.918) 
SURY (-1)        -0.4627  -0.4697  -0.4649 
        (-17.449)  (-11.222)  (-17.031) 
SUBCOM  0.0362  0.0431  0.0408  -0.0357  -0.0356  -0.0356 
  (2.000)  (1.699)  (2.362)  (-1671)  (-1.355)  (-1.601) 
MONGE  -0.1691  -0.1598  -0.1702  0.2964  0.3047  0.2974 
  (-2.813)  (-1.789)  (-3.023)  (4.187)  (1.131)  (4.077) 
ARIAS  -0.0671  -0.0526  -0.0655  0.0323  0.0221  0.0311 
  (-1.648)  (-0.374)  (-1.702)  (0.666)  (0.123)  (0.621) 
CALDERON  -0.1057  -0.0985  -0.1066  0.0498  0.0394  0.0489 
  (-2.947)  (-1.403)  (-3.115)  (1.171)  (0.424)  (-1.110) 
FYA  -0.0881  -0.0744  -0.0817  -0.1149  -0.1117  -0.1147 
  (-3.208)  (-1.143)  (-3.171)  (-3.599)  (-1.338)  (-3.482) 
SYA  -0.0301  -0.0104  -0.0195  0.0010  -0.0042  0.0003 
  (-1.463)  (-0.255)  (-1.007)  (0.04)  (-0.098)  (0.011) 
TYA  -0.0165  -0.0087  -0.0132  -0.0640  -0.0683  -0.0644 
  (-0.737)  (-0.353)  (-0.629)  (-2.444)  (-1.934)  (-2.388) 
VFI  -0.0005  0.0001  -0.0001  0.0008  0.0008  0.0008 
  (-1.031)  (0.107)  (-0.255)  (1.472)  (0.952)  (1.376) 
FOR  -0.0005  0.0007  0.0001  0.0002  -0.0003  0.0001 
  (0.639)  (0.352)  (0.159)  (-0.197)  (-0.114)  (0.117) 
POP  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  (-6.887)  (-0.041)  (-5.038)  (-0.164)  (0.032)  (-0.02) 
RWAGE  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  (-2.01)  (-0.177)  (-1.413)  (-0.918)  (-0.600)  (-0.983) 
TCRGDP  -0.3058  -0.2634  -0.2767  0.7651  0.771  0.7664 
  (-2.489)  (-2.138)  (-2.414)  (5.565)  (5.062)  (5.419) 
DEFGDP  2.7031  2.8147  2.7773  -5.5000  -5.5645  -5.5242 
  (2.482)  (1.721)  (2.725)  (-4.238)  (-3.477)  (-4.128) 
Constant  0.3663    0.3529  -0.1726    -0.1660 
  (5.107)    (4.701)  (-1.973)    (-1.776) 
2 R   0.2942  0.4324  0.2797  0.2562  0.2699  0.2561 
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The estimates resulting from the regression are reported in Table 14, for both the 
regression on SACY as in SURY. The most notable effect is on the regression on SURY: there is 
a significant improvement in the goodness of fit by simply including the lagged value SURY (-1). 
Not surprisingly, an important intertemporal element must be present in the behavior of the 
municipal deficits.  The estimates obtained indicate also that there is a positive association 
between the SACY that a municipality receives with the surplus of the period. 
It should be noted, though, that the results on the relationship between SA and municipal 
deficits reported here should be seen as the first step of what should be a much extensive 
econometric investigation. Moreover, the results are not quite robust different definitions of the 
fiscal surplus, such as subtracting the other  central government transfers and grants and 
expressing the series in per capita terms or as a fraction. It would also be necessary to experiment 
with different identification assumption and different definitions. Moreover, once the use of 
lagged values as instruments was begun, then, contrary to common practice, the dynamic nature 
of the system should be recognized. This would lead to a Vector Auto-Regressive system. The 
estimation of a VAR would provide a much richer set of tools and implications by explicitly 
incorporating the dynamics between specific allocations and municipal surplus. There, however, 
the identification would be more challenging, and the selection of the right estimator in the 
presence of panel data would be a more difficult question. Pursuing this line of inquiry, however, 
lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
Finally, it should be stressed that the results of the effect of local and national political 
variables as well as demographic factors are quite robust. The second model is consistent with 
the more parsimonious simple static regressions, though both models are fairly effective in 
indicating the effect of local and national political variables. The picture drawn by the 
regressions clearly shows the importance of national politics in the functioning of municipalities 
and in the resources available to them. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
This paper has presented evidence that the resource allocation and decision making of the public 
sector are highly concentrated in Costa Rica’s Central Government. By explicit regulations and 
restrictions, local governments are dramatically subordinated to decisions by the President of the 
Republic and the Deputies in the National Congress. In addition, the duties of the municipalities   46
are very minor, and are reduced to basic public services. The restrictions that municipalities face, 
though, prevent even the investments required to provide those services and effectively make 
them dependent on transfers from the different Ministries or the Congress. 
The cases of municipal bailouts by the Central Government strongly supports the 
hypothesis of local government subordination to the central government. The episodes uniformly 
indicate that when local governments face economic hardship, the Central Government must step 
in. Otherwise, the political cost will be borne by the political party ruling at that time. The 
involvement of the central government goes well beyond the implicit backing up of debts. 
Indeed, it is safe to state that a major consideration in the election of local representatives is their 
ability to obtain resources from the Congress. 
In particular, the paper examined the interrelation between the local governments with 
the Executive and Legislative branches of the Central Government, and the effect of national and 
local political variables on the transfers received by municipalities. The paper additionally 
examined the resulting performance and fiscal efforts of local governments, presented results on 
a large and original database, and examined episodes in which the Central Government has 
bailed out one or several local governments from financial obligations. 
The centralization becomes evident by simply looking at the electoral process. National 
parties play a key role in the election of all Local Councils, and inhabitants of the cantones can 
only vote for provincial lists of candidates to Congress, which are determined by the national 
candidates. The data shows that ties with the Congress significantly affect municipalities’ budget 
constraint. Moreover, there is a  significant interaction between local and national political 
variables. Municipalities governed by the party in the Central Government receive more transfers 
from the national budget than other municipalities. 
The main problem in intra-governmental relations in Costa Rica is not the excessive 
freedom of local governments in public resources. On the contrary, the problem lies in the 
inability of the municipalities to do very much at all, and the little they have under their 
responsibility is subject to interference by the Central Government. Such interference further 
undermines the working of local governments, making it difficult for the population to 
disentangle the performance of the municipality from the actions of representatives in the Central 
government. In the end, then, virtually all the incentives for the members of the Municipal   47
Council are diverted from directly raising local revenue to lobbying Central Government and the 
Congress for grants. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
One contribution of the present work is the construction of an exhaustive database on the 
different cantones of Costa Rica. The database, not only include the financial aspects of the 
Municipalities, it also include local electoral outcomes as well as demographic variables and 
socioeconomic variables of all the cantones for the period of 1980 to 1997. Most notably, we 
include the value of the SA, including the name of the Deputy that assigned them as well as 
automatic transfers from the Ministry of Finance. We are unaware of the existence of a 
comparable database. 
 
Municipal Political Variables 
 
SUBCOM A dummy variable that takes the value one if the municipality i at time t received any 
specific allocation from a deputy that belongs to the  Sub-Comisión de Hacendarios  of the 
Legislative Assembly; zero otherwise. 
 
M2PC A dummy variable reports the value 1 if the local government receives at least 2 percent 
of the total amount of SA from one deputy during one year.  To construct this dummy variable 
we worked in two steps.  First, we wrote a matrix with 81 rows representing local governments 
and the columns representing the number of deputies assigning SA.   ij A  represents the 
percentage of total allocations received by municipality i from the deputy j in that year.  We 
assigned the value 1 to the ij A  with the value 2 percent or higher, 0 otherwise.
18 
 
National Political Variables 
 
MONGE 1 if the PLN Administration is 1982-1986, 0 otherwise. 
 
ARIAS 1 if the PLN Administration is 1986-1990, 0 otherwise. 
 
CALDERON 1 if the PUSC Administration is 1990-1994, 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
18 The value of 2 percent originated the largest 
2 R  between SA and this dummy variable, as increasing the value of 
2 percent would exclude several municipalities reducing the number of 1’s and hence reducing the 
2 R . For the 
1990-1998 period, this methodology captured between 11 to 14 municipalities per year receiving at least 2 percent 
of the total amount of SA from one deputy. 
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FYA 1 if is the First Year of Administration, 0 otherwise. 
 
SYA 1 if is the Second Year of Administration, 0 otherwise. 
 
TYA 1 if is the Third Year of Administration, 0 otherwise. 
 
POL 1 if the local government shows same affiliation than central government, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Local Government Financial Variables 
 
SURY Surplus of the local government i as a fraction of the total income of the county i, at 
moment t. 
 
SURCY Deficit less transfers of the local government i as a fraction of the total income of the 
county i, at moment t. 
 
SACY Specific allocations received by the local government i as a fraction of the total income of 
the county i. 
 
SUR This variable represents the surplus or deficit of the municipality i between the moment t-1 
and t, i.e., this is the result of the following subtraction: the surplus (deficit) of the local 
government in the moment t less the surplus (deficit) at t-1. 
 
VFI The degree of vertical imbalance measured by the ratio between the total revenue of the 
local government originated in the central government to the total revenue of the local 
government. 
 
FOR The Flexibility of Revenue represent the degree of flexibility of revenue of the local 
government i at the moment t. This is the ratio between the revenues that the municipal council 
can modify without the approval of the Legislative Assembly dividing this amount by the total 




POP Population of the Local Government. 
 
RWAGE Average Wage in Constants Colones. 
 
GRRGDP Rate of growth of real gross domestic product. 
 
SURGDP Deficit of the Central Government as a fraction of national GDP. 
 